Pope’s Regensburg Address


Dear Readers: Too often I find myself on the Internet relying on the insights and interpretations of specific pundits to form my opinions on certain matters. I think it is important to have the discipline go back and look at the source documentation, making my own judgements and questing for additional insights when warranted.

I must admit, in matters of theology, I am limited. I am a scientist. However, I would like to introduce Rust57. He is extremely well read and well versed in religious history and comparative theology. In the interest of full disclosure, Rusty57 is an atheist. However, I have found him profoundly respectful in discussions of faith (a rare, fair trait), and asked him to discuss the Pope’s Regensburg address. His writings are below.

In the next day or so, I will place my comments on the Letter to the Pope prepared by Muslim clerics, which have been mentioned here. Many in the Rightosphere deride the Muslim letter as whiny complaints against the papal leader, and that the Pope was simply calling for an interfaith dialog to fight godlessness. However, looking at the source documents, I think the matter is far more complex.

I do acknowledge that Islamic radicals used this opportunity to foment terror. The Muslim contributors on this site are not those Muslims. Let us be willing to explore both source documents.

In this matter, I am a student. I will be inviting Rusty57 to lead this discussion. As a reminder to all, this as an Insult Free Zone. Disagree, yes. But do so politely, and with quality links and references so we can consider your views with respect and render our own judgements.

For clarity, Rusty57’s comments are blockquoted, and the Pope’s address are in the main body of the following text:


Dear Isis:

My apologies for not having my critique of the pope’s Regensburg Address done sooner, but Pope Benedict’s speech leans heavily on ancient Greek philosophy and Medieval theology. Two areas I haven’t studied in great detail. Which is why I kept getting different impressions of the meaning, each time I read it. I knew this wasn’t going to be a quick read, but this one was even harder than I figured it would be.

The Pope’s address before the theological seminary in Regensburg is understandably loaded with references to philosophical and theological concepts that are unfamiliar for the average reader, but even considering the audience, this speech is a riddle, wrapped in an enigma. It seems that unlike the commonly reported story that the pope spoke extemporaneously and was not aware of the impact his words would have, on the contrary, if you consider all of the symbolism of the references he used, there is no way he could have been unaware of the implications that can be drawn from this speech.

Considering some previous speeches, where the pope has indicated a tougher line with the Muslim world. Demanding reciprocity by insisting that Muslim countries allow new churches to be built as new mosques face no barriers in Europe. And he has a different conception of dialogue with Muslim leaders than Pope John Paul II did.

This appears to be a kind of turf war as the pope wants a Christian revival in Europe and a halt to the growth of Islam in European countries. The previous pope saw Muslim leaders as an ally against secularism. Pope Benedict’s address indicates an opposite policy, hinting for rational secularists to extend reason to examine Christianity and see its superiority over Islam. And the homage paid to a revered Byzantine emperor and the references to the Greek Church clearly indicate he wants an alliance with the Eastern Orthodox Churches in a common front against Islam.

The pope is 79 years old and apparently in poor health, so he won’t see much in the way of results of his policy shift. Perhaps he sees himself as a catalyst in saving the Church in Europe. I just hope he’s not part of a process that could end with religious war.

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a moving experience for me to stand and give a lecture at this university podium once again. I think back to those years when, after a pleasant period at the Freisinger Hochschule, I began teaching at the University of Bonn. This was in 1959, in the days of the old university made up of ordinary professors. The various chairs had neither assistants nor secretaries, but in recompense there was much direct contact with students and in particular among the professors themselves.

We would meet before and after lessons in the rooms of the teaching staff. There was a lively exchange with historians, philosophers, philologists and, naturally, between the two theological faculties. Once a semester there was a dies academicus, when professors from every faculty appeared before the students of the entire university, making possible a genuine experience of universitas: the reality that despite our specializations which at times make it difficult to communicate with each other, we made up a whole, working in everything on the basis of a single rationality with its various aspects and sharing responsibility for the right use of reason– this reality became a lived experience.

The university was also very proud of its two theological faculties. It was clear that, by inquiring about the reasonableness of faith, they too carried out a work which is necessarily part of the whole of the universitas scientiarum, even if not everyone could share the faith which theologians seek to correlate with reason as a whole. This profound sense of coherence within the universe of reason was not troubled, even when it was once reported that a colleague had said there was something odd about our university: it had two faculties devoted to something that did not exist: God. That even in the face of such radical skepticism it is still necessary and reasonable to raise the question of God through the use of reason, and to do so in the context of the tradition of the Christian faith: this, within the university as a whole, was accepted without question.

I was reminded of all this recently, when I read the edition by Professor Theodore Khoury (Münster) of part of the dialogue carried on– perhaps in 1391 in the winter barracks near Ankara– by the erudite Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus and an educated Persian on the subject of Christianity and Islam, and the truth of both. It was probably the emperor himself who set down this dialogue, during the siege of Constantinople between 1394 and 1402; and this would explain why his arguments are given in greater detail than the responses of the learned Persian.

The dialogue ranges widely over the structures of faith contained in the Bible and in the Qur’an, and deals especially with the image of God and of man, while necessarily returning repeatedly to the relationship of the three Laws: the Old Testament, the New Testament, and the Qur’an. In this lecture I would like to discuss only one point– itself rather marginal to the dialogue itself– which, in the context of the issue of faith and reason, I found interesting and which can serve as the starting-point for my reflections on this issue.

In the seventh conversation edited by Professor Khoury, the emperor touches on the theme of the jihad (holy war). The emperor must have known that surah 2, 256 reads: There is no compulsion in religion. It is one of the suras of the early period, when Mohammed was still powerless and under threat.

But naturally the emperor also knew the instructions, developed later and recorded in the Qur’an, concerning holy war. Without descending to details, such as the difference in treatment accorded to those who have the “Book” and the “infidels,” he turns to his interlocutor somewhat brusquely with the central question on the relationship between religion and violence in general, in these words:

Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.

The emperor goes on to explain in detail the reasons why spreading the faith through violence is something unreasonable. Violence is incompatible with the nature of God and the nature of the soul.

God is not pleased by blood, and not acting reasonably is contrary to God’s nature. Faith is born of the soul, not the body. Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without violence and threats… To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need
a strong arm, or weapons of any kind, or any other means of threatening a person with death….

As far as understanding of God and thus the concrete practice of religion is concerned, we find ourselves faced with a dilemma which nowadays challenges us directly. Is the conviction that acting unreasonably contradicts God’s nature merely a Greek idea, or is it always and intrinsically true? I believe that here we can see the profound harmony between what is Greek in the best sense of the word and the biblical understanding of faith in God. Modifying the first verse of the Book of Genesis, John began the prologue of his Gospel with the words: In the beginning was the logos. This is the very word used by the emperor: God acts with logos.

At first, it seemed the speech was primarily an attack on secular reasoning, and a quotation of the Byzantine emperor condemning Islam was just added as an aside to bolster his claim that because modern secular reasoning doesn’t consider religious claims proveable, then they consider all conceptions of God beyond rational criticism.

Some media reports(like the New York Times) stated that it was mainly a condemnation of secularism that contained an unfortunate, poorly thought out quote from Emperor Paleologus. I thought the same thing at first, because content-wise, the address devotes more attention to modern reasoning than it does to Islam.

But considering the use of the quote from the second last emperor of Byzantium, I wondered why did the pope make the dangerous analogy of using Islam as the example of forced, violent conversion, instead of using one of the myriad examples from his own church’s history. He could have used the 4th century persecution of gnostics, arianists and other significant opponents of the growing Roman orthodoxy. Or he could have pointed to slaughter of heretics during the inquisitions of the Middle Ages. He conveniently ignored the bloody history of Europe’s dark age that the Church was either powerless to alleviate, or contributed to that era of misery. In comparison, during that time, the Muslim world was at least tolerating non-Muslim minorities and preserving art, medicine, music and science.

The decisive statement in this argument against violent conversion is this: not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God’s nature. The editor, Theodore Khoury, observes: “For the emperor, as a Byzantine shaped by Greek philosophy, this statement is self-evident. But for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality.” Here Khoury quotes a work of the noted French Islamist R. Arnaldez, who points out that Ibn Hazn went so far as to state that God is not bound even by his own word, and that nothing would oblige him to reveal the truth to us. Were it God’s will, we would even have to practice idolatry.

This one surprised me. I was under the impression that mainstream Christian theology contended that God was omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent. In other words, under no constraints or limits. Here Pope Benedict is proposing that the Christian God has limits. He cannot violate universal moral and ethical standards.

Logos means both reason and word– a reason which is creative and capable of self-communication, precisely as reason. John thus spoke the final word on the biblical concept of God, and in this word all the often toilsome and tortuous threads of biblical faith find their culmination and synthesis. In the beginning was the logos, and the logos is God, says the Evangelist.

The encounter between the Biblical message and Greek thought did not happen by chance. The vision of Saint Paul, who saw the roads to Asia barred and in a dream saw a Macedonian man plead with him: Come over to Macedonia and help us! (cf. Acts 16:6-10)– this vision can be interpreted as a distillation of the intrinsic necessity of a rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek inquiry.

In point of fact, this rapprochement had been going on for some time. The mysterious name of God, revealed from the burning bush, a name which separates this God from all other divinities with their many names and declares simply that he is, is already presents a challenge to the notion of myth, to which Socrates’s attempt to vanquish and transcend myth stands in close analogy. Within the Old Testament, the process which started at the burning bush came to new maturity at the time of the Exile, when the God of Israel, an Israel now deprived of its land and worship, was proclaimed as the God of heaven and earth and described in a simple formula which echoes the words uttered at the burning bush: I am.

This new understanding of God is accompanied by a kind of enlightenment, which finds stark _expression in the mockery of gods who are merely the work of human hands (cf. Ps 115). Thus, despite the bitter conflict with those Hellenistic rulers who sought to accommodate it forcibly to the customs and idolatrous cult of the Greeks, biblical faith, in the Hellenistic period, encountered the best of Greek thought at a deep level, resulting in a mutual enrichment evident especially in the later wisdom literature.

Today we know that the Greek translation of the Old Testament produced at Alexandria– the Septuagint– is more than a simple (and in that sense perhaps less than satisfactory) translation of the Hebrew text: it is an independent textual witness and a distinct and important step in the history of revelation, one which brought about this encounter in a way that was decisive for the birth and spread of Christianity. A profound encounter of faith and reason is taking place here, an encounter between genuine enlightenment and religion. From the very heart of Christian faith and, at the same time, the heart of Greek thought now joined to faith, Manuel II was able to say: Not to act “with logos” is contrary to God’s nature.

In all honesty, one must observe that in the late Middle Ages we find trends in theology which would sunder this synthesis between the Greek spirit and the Christian spirit. In contrast with the so-called intellectualism of Augustine and Thomas, there arose with Duns Scotus a voluntarism which ultimately led to the claim that we can only know God’s voluntas ordinata. Beyond this is the realm of God’s freedom, in virtue of which he could have done the opposite of everything he has actually done. This gives rise to positions which clearly approach those of Ibn Hazn and might even lead to the image of a capricious God, who is not even bound to truth and goodness. God’s transcendence and otherness are so exalted that our reason, our sense of the true and good, are no longer an authentic mirror of God, whose deepest possibilities remain eternally unattainable and hidden behind his actual decisions.

As opposed to this, the faith of the Church has always insisted that between God and us, between his eternal Creator Spirit and our created reason there exists a real analogy, in which unlikeness remains infinitely greater than likeness, yet not to the point of abolishing analogy and its language (cf. Lateran IV). God does not become more divine when we push him away from us in a sheer, impenetrable voluntarism; rather, the truly divine God is the God who has revealed himself as logos and, as logos, has acted and continues to act lovingly on our behalf. Certainly, love transcends knowledge and is thereby capable of perceiving more than thought alone (cf. Eph 3:19); nonetheless it continues to be love of the God who is logos. Consequently, Christian worship is worship in harmony with the eternal Word and with our reason (cf. Rom 12:1).

This inner rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek philosophical inquiry was an event of decisive importance not only from the standpoint of the history of religions, but also from that of world history-– it is an event which concerns us even today. Given this convergence, it is not surprising that Christianity, despite its origins and some significant developments in the East, finally took on its historically decisive character in Europe. We can also express this the other way around: this convergence, with the subsequent addition of the Roman heritage, created Europe and remains the foundation of what can rightly be called Europe.

If European culture is to be interpreted as a synthesis of Greek philosophy, Christianity(including the Eastern Rites), and Roman heritage; that could be a message that Islam doesn’t belong in Europe. Combined with the previous condemnation of the Prophet and the Islamic conception of God, this seems like the pope is reaching out to the Orthodox Christians in a unified effort to oppose the spread of Islam within Europe.

The thesis that the critically purified Greek heritage forms an integral part of Christian faith has been countered by the call for a dehellenization of Christianity-– a call which has more and more dominated theological discussions since the beginning of the modern age. Viewed more closely, three stages can be observed in the program of dehellenization: although interconnected, they are clearly distinct from one another in their motivations and objectives.

Dehellenization first emerges in connection with the fundamental postulates of the Reformation in the 16th century. Looking at the tradition of scholastic theology, the Reformers thought they were confronted with a faith system totally conditioned by philosophy, that is to say an articulation of the faith based on an alien system of thought. As a result, faith no longer appeared as a living historical Word but as one element of an overarching philosophical system. The principle of sola scriptura, on the other hand, sought faith in its pure, primordial form, as originally found in the biblical Word. Metaphysics appeared as a premise derived from another source, from which faith had to be liberated in order to become once more fully itself. When Kant stated that he needed to set thinking aside in order to make room for faith, he carried this program forward with a radicalism that the Reformers could never have foreseen. He thus anchored faith exclusively in practical reason, denying it access to reality as a whole.

The liberal theology of the 19th and 20th centuries ushered in a second stage in the process of dehellenization, with Adolf von Harnack as its outstanding representative. When I was a student, and in the early years of my teaching, this program was highly influential in Catholic theology too. It took as its point of departure Pascal’s distinction between the God of the philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

In my inaugural lecture at Bonn in 1959, I tried to address the issue. I will not repeat here what I said on that occasion, but I would like to describe at least briefly what was new about this second stage of dehellenization. Harnack’s central idea was to return simply to the man Jesus and to his simple message, underneath the accretions of theology and indeed of hellenization: this simple message was seen as the culmination of the religious development of humanity. Jesus was said to have put an end to worship in favor of morality. In the end he was presented as the father of a humanitarian moral message. The fundamental goal was to bring Christianity back into harmony with modern reason, liberating it, that is to say, from seemingly philosophical and theological elements, such as faith in Christ’s divinity and the triune God.

In this sense, historical-critical exegesis of the New Testament restored to theology its place within the university: theology, for Harnack, is something essentially historical and therefore strictly scientific. What it is able to say critically about Jesus is, so to speak, an _expression of practical reason and consequently it can take its rightful place within the university. Behind this thinking lies the modern self-limitation of reason, classically expressed in Kant’s “Critiques”, but in the meantime further radicalized by the impact of the natural sciences. This modern concept of reason is based, to put it briefly, on a synthesis between Platonism (Cartesianism) and empiricism, a synthesis confirmed by the success of technology. On the one hand it presupposes the mathematical structure of matter, its intrinsic rationality, which makes it possible to understand how matter works and use it efficiently: this basic premise is, so to speak, the Platonic element in the modern understanding of nature. On the other hand, there is nature’s capacity to be exploited for our purposes, and here only the possibility of verification or falsification through experimentation can yield ultimate certainty. The weight between the two poles can, depending on the circumstances, shift from one side to the other. As strongly positivistic a thinker as J. Monod has declared himself a convinced Platonist/Cartesian.

This gives rise to two principles which are crucial for the issue we have raised. First, only the kind of certainty resulting from the interplay of mathematical and empirical elements can be considered scientific. Anything that would claim to be science must be measured against this criterion. Hence the human sciences, such as history, psychology, sociology, and philosophy, attempt to conform themselves to this canon of scientificity. A second point, which is important for our reflections, is that by its very nature this method excludes the question of God, making it appear an unscientific or pre-scientific question. Consequently, we are faced with a reduction of the radius of science and reason, one which needs to be questioned.

We shall return to this problem later. In the meantime, it must be observed that from this standpoint any attempt to maintain theology’s claim to be “scientific” would end up reducing Christianity to a mere fragment of its former self. But we must say more: it is man himself who ends up being reduced, for the specifically human questions about our origin and destiny, the questions raised by religion and ethics, then have no place within the purview of collective reason as defined by “science” and must thus be relegated to the realm of the subjective. The subject then decides, on the basis of his experiences, what he considers tenable in matters of religion, and the subjective “conscience” becomes the sole arbiter of what is ethical. In this way, though, ethics and religion lose their power to create a community and become a completely personal matter.

This is a dangerous state of affairs for humanity, as we see from the disturbing pathologies of religion and reason which necessarily erupt when reason is so reduced that questions of religion and ethics no longer concern it. Attempts to construct an ethic from the rules of evolution or from psychology and sociology, end up being simply inadequate.

Before I draw the conclusions to which all this has been leading, I must briefly refer to the third stage of dehellenization, which is now in progress. In the light of our experience with cultural pluralism, it is often said nowadays that the synthesis with Hellenism achieved in the early Church was a preliminary inculturation which ought not to be binding on other cultures. The latter are said to have the right to return to the simple message of the New Testament prior to that inculturation, in order to inculturate it anew in their own particular milieux. This thesis is not only false; it is coarse and lacking in precision. The New Testament was written in Greek and bears the imprint of the Greek spirit, which had already come to maturity as the Old Testament developed. True, there are elements in the evolution of the early Church which do not have to be integrated into all cultures. Nonetheless, the fundamental decisions made about the relationship between faith and the use of human reason are part of the faith itself; they are developments consonant with the nature of faith itself.

And so I come to my conclusion. This attempt, painted with broad strokes, at a critique of modern reason from within has nothing to do with putting the clock back to the time before the Enlightenment and rejecting the insights of the modern age. The positive aspects of modernity are to be acknowledged unreservedly: we are all grateful for the marvelous possibilities that it has opened up for mankind and for the progress in humanity that has been granted to us. The scientific ethos, moreover, is the will to be obedient to the truth, and, as such, it embodies an attitude which reflects one of the basic tenets of Christianity. The intention here is not one of retrenchment or negative criticism, but of broadening our concept of reason and its application.

While we rejoice in the new possibilities open to humanity, we also see the dangers arising from these possibilities and we must ask ourselves how we can overcome them. We will succeed in doing so only if reason and faith come together in a new way, if we overcome the self-imposed limitation of reason to the empirically verifiable, and if we once more disclose its vast horizons. In this sense theology rightly belongs in the university and within the wide-ranging dialogue of sciences, not merely as a historical discipline and one of the human sciences, but precisely as theology, as inquiry into the rationality of faith.

I got the impression from this part of the dissertation on reason that the pope wants the definition of reason to be broadened to include concepts that cannot be verified objectively. He lets the reader know how unhappy he is with Immanuel Kant for proposing these limits in his Critique of Pure Reason.

Only thus do we become capable of that genuine dialogue of cultures and religions so urgently needed today. In the Western world it is widely held that only positivistic reason and the forms of philosophy based on it are universally valid. Yet the world’s profoundly religious cultures see this exclusion of the divine from the universality of reason as an attack on their most profound convictions. A reason which is deaf to the divine and which relegates religion into the realm of subcultures is incapable of entering into the dialogue of cultures. At the same time, as I have attempted to show, modern scientific reason with its intrinsically Platonic element bears within itself a question which points beyond itself and beyond the possibilities of its methodology.

Modern scientific reason quite simply has to accept the rational structure of matter and the correspondence between our spirit and the prevailing rational structures of nature as a given, on which its methodology has to be based. Yet the question why this has to be so is a real question, and one which has to be remanded by the natural sciences to other modes and planes of thought: to philosophy and theology.

Is the pope proposing that modern scientific reason should remove the Christian God from the safe zone provided by theology and insert God into the natural processes that govern nature. This might be a reason why some are speculating that the Catholic Church is going to abandon its acceptance of evolution and embrace Intelligent Design. Not all scientists are afraid to discuss belief in God or the value of religion. Before the pope made this address, he should have been informed about people like Daniel Dennet and Richard Dawkins, who are willing to take up the challenge of examining evidence for God and the merit of religious belief. The pope would not like the opinions expressed by these scientists about the things the pope holds dear. And let’s not forget, there are other Gods. Other religions like Islam and Hinduism could claim it’s their God or Gods that are the life force of the natural world

For philosophy and, albeit in a different way, for theology, listening to the great experiences and insights of the religious traditions of humanity, and those of the Christian faith in particular, is a source of knowledge, and to ignore it would be an unacceptable restriction of our listening and responding. Here I am reminded of something Socrates said to Phaedo. In their earlier conversations, many false philosophical opinions had been raised, and so Socrates says: “It would be easily understandable if someone became so annoyed at all these false notions that for the rest of his life he despised and mocked all talk about being – but in this way he would be deprived of the truth of existence and would suffer a great loss”.

The West has long been endangered by this aversion to the questions which underlie its rationality, and can only suffer great harm thereby. The courage to engage the whole breadth of reason, and not the denial of its grandeur – this is the program with which a theology grounded in Biblical faith enters into the debates of our time. “Not to act reasonably (with logos) is contrary to the nature of God”, said Manuel II, according to his Christian understanding of God, in response to his Persian interlocutor. It is to this great logos, to this breadth of reason, that we invite our partners in the dialogue of cultures. To rediscover it constantly is the great task of the university.

Here the pope links his appeal to expand the boundaries of reason with Manuel II’s appeal to distinguish between a righteous faith and a dangerous, violent one.

Right now, I’m thinking that it’s a good thing even most of the critics didn’t get the true meaning of the pope’s dissertation. Because it appears that he is welcoming scientific inquiry of his religion, but he believes an analytical analysis of Islam will find it inferior to Christianity. Considering the dangerous times we live in, if the pope is hoping to inspire Christians in Europe to forge an alliance with secular humanists and Eastern Orthodox to stop a Muslim takeover of Europe.



5 Responses to “Pope’s Regensburg Address”

  1. jh Says:

    A few thoughts. I think one must understand what the Catholic Church’s traditional view of Islam is. That helps us know where the Church is coming from. Traditionally the Church does not see it as a seperate religion. It sees it really as a Christian Heresy. That has some historical support. Basically Islam is the natural consequence of Arianism and Calvinism on steroids.

    Where is the Pope going with this? I agree these words were not by accident. He knew full well what he was doing. However, I think he felt called to do it and felt he had no choice. FOr all the talk of a possible civil or religious war I think the Pope thinks it will happen unless he is blunt. I am not some rightwinger that thinks Islam is a death cult. I know much of what I read is sensational. However the signs in Europe are troubling. There appears to be less and less assimilation with European values as the years go by. This is why he was so blunt.

    Further let me add that the Pope concerns about recipocral rights is huge. In fact in certain areas the Govt will have a choice. Recpocral rights or the Church will go underground. .

    Anyway I look forward to this discussion

  2. rusty57 Says:

    Thanks for your comment JH. For starters, I’d like to know more about your contention that Islam is viewed by the Catholic Church as a Christian heresy. I have never come across that concept before and would like to know more about it.

    I can see where Islam may have been influenced by Arianism or other early Christian unitarian movements such as the Ebionites and Marcionites, but you’ll have to explain to me how it is connected with Calvinism!

    I don’t have a great deal of first-hand knowledge about the situation in Europe, but many analysts point out that the problems in Muslim communities there go beyond religion, to include issues of race since many native English, French, Germans etc. see immigration as a threat to their racial purity and national character. These feelings are rarely voiced out loud except by the neofascist parties.

    The last point about reciprocity represents a confused message from the Pope. Which does he consider more important: maintaining Christian domination in Europe, or the opportunity to evangelize and build churches in Saudi Arabia? If it’s the latter, how would this equal opportunity to spread the Catholic faith in Arabia stop the Islamization of Europe? Which does he consider to be the most important objective? Or is the point about reciprocity just a rhetorical argument?

  3. Lawrence of Arabia Says:

    i hesitate to put words in the mouth of jh, but i suspect when he references a link between calvinism and islam he is merely noting islam’s strong sense of providence (obviously talk of direct influence of calvin on islam would be impossible). certainly that is not unique to calvin but is present throughout the entire augustinian tradition.

    i thought i would make a comment about your claim’s concerning omnipotence in the xn tradition. you said:
    “This one surprised me. I was under the impression that mainstream Christian theology contended that God was omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent. In other words, under no constraints or limits. Here Pope Benedict is proposing that the Christian God has limits. He cannot violate universal moral and ethical standards.”

    while the nominalists did understand god in the manner you describe, and through their influence one would also include parts of the lutheran reformation, i would say that the mainstream of xn theology does NOT hold a position of god’s power that is so free-wheeling. on the other hand, they would also not say that god has limits in the sense that moral or rational standards are something god has to bow down to. there is nothing beyond god. instead what they would say is that god is true to who god is. god is the good; god is reason. when we talk about the good, that is what we mean when we say the word god. a nominalist position actually contradicts god’s own being.

    i also think it is fair to say that theology and philosophy within the mainstream xn tradition is not going to be satisfied with the account of reason given by kant (though you certainly see them using kant’s 2nd critique at times). they are going to demand a much more speculative (in the technical philosophical sense) account of reason. and this is true beyond xty: you see it in levinas and even in an “atheist” like derrida. and there is certainly a tradition of this within islam as well. falasafia has and continues to have its place.

    my suspicion is that ratzinger/pope benny thinks that if the boundaries are opened between xty and islam and a rational discussion ensues in the public and academic forums that xty will show itself to be more adequate. thus he pushes for openness and mutuality b/c he thinks xty will win the discussion.

  4. rusty57 Says:

    I’ve always had trouble with the issue of divine providence! In the Bible, many scriptures imply that men and women have free will to choose good or evil, yet providence implies predestination for God to know what the future has in store for us.

    The Islamic scholars who wrote a rebuttal to the Pope’s address take issue with his statement that “for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent, His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality.” They point out that the Pope quoted a marginal scholar from a now defunct school of sharia. http://www.islamicamagazine.com/letter/

    Kant’s attempt to remove God from empirical analysis was the inspiration for biologist Stephen J. Goulds desire to separate science and religion into what he called, “nonoverlapping magesteria.” Gould figured that if the Church could leave science to address the empirical gathering of knowledge about the origins and workings of the universe, the scienctific establishment could leave questions of moral meaning and value to religion.

    It would be nice if it was possible! But the fact is that science is encroaching on religion with research into mythology, psychology, and neurophysiology. Philosopher Daniel Dennet is trying formulate a scientific analysis of religion to explain its origins and propagation by using a naturalistic approach. And on the other side, Buddhism might be able to stay out of the way of modern science but all three of the Abrahamic religions make claims about origins, consciousness and human nature that conflict with scientific research.

    When it’s all said and done, I don’t see what is to be gained by religious oneupmanship! If the Pope was able to prove his case that Catholicism is the better religion, does he believe that over a billion Muslims (and Protestants, Hindus etc.) will be so impressed that they will change religions?

    Maybe I shouldn’t ask that question, because he believes that everyone in the world should be a member of his church! But to a secularist, organized religions are crucial parts of a culture’s historic narrative. There are always isolated instances of people changing religions, usually for marriage, but the only times in history when entire groups change religion is either through forced conversion or during a time of crisis, when existing theology isn’t solving the needs of the people. This occured in the Americas, when the aboriginal indians converted en mass to Christianity. The European explorers and settlers brought many Old World diseases with them that wiped out large numbers of natives. Many of the Indians saw their sickness as a sign that the white man’s God was superior to the gods of their ancestors.

    In modern day Europe, the Pope would do more good by making an honest effort to discover why today’s Europeans have lost faith in the Church and see it as an irrelevant institution, rather than just relying on whipping up fear of a Muslim takeover to regain the Church’s lost prestige!

  5. Manas Says:

    Here is a Muslim commentary of the Pope’s speech:


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